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Abstract:  Cash transfers targeted to poor people, but conditional on some behavior on their 
part, such as school attendance or regular visits to health care facilities, are being 
adopted in a growing number of developing countries. Even where ex-post impact 
evaluations have been conducted, a number of policy-relevant counterfactual 
questions have remained unanswered. These are questions about the potential 
impact of changes in program design, such as benefit levels or the choice of the 
means-test, on both the current welfare and the behavioral response of household 
members. This paper proposes a method to simulate the effects of those 
alternative program designs on welfare and behavior, based on micro-
econometrically estimated models of household behavior. In an application to 
Brazil’s recently introduced federal Bolsa Escola program, we find a surprisingly 
strong effect of the conditionality on school attendance, but a muted impact of the 
transfers on the reduction of current poverty and inequality levels. 
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1. Introduction 
 
During the 1990s, a new brand of redistribution programs was adopted in many 
developing countries. Although local versions varied, programs such as Food for 
Education in Bangladesh, Bolsa Escola in Brazil, and Progresa in Mexico are all means-
tested conditional cash transfer programs. As the name indicates, they share two defining 
features, which jointly set them apart from most pre-existing programs, whether in 
developing or developed countries. The first of these is the means-test, defined in terms 
of a maximum household income level, above which households are not eligible to 
receive the benefit.
3 The second is the behavioral conditionality, which operates through 
the requirement that applicant households, in addition to satisfying the income targeting, 
have members regularly undertake some pre-specified action. The most common such 
requirement is for children between 6 and 14 years of age to remain enrolled and actually 
in attendance at school. In Mexico’s Progresa, additional requirements applied to some 
households, such as obligatory pre- and post-natal visits for pregnant women or lactating 
mothers. 
The implementation of these programs have generated considerable interest, both 
in the countries where they took place and in the international academic and policy-
making communities. Accordingly, a great deal of effort has been placed in evaluating 
their impact. There are two types of approach for evaluating the effects of these programs 
on the various aspects of household welfare that they seek to affect. Ex-post approaches 
consist of comparing observed beneficiaries of the program with non-beneficiaries, 
possibly after controlling for selection into the first or the second group if truly random 
samples are not available. An important literature has recently developed on these 
techniques and many applications to social programs have been made in various 
countries.
4  
                                                 
3 For verification and enforcement reasons, the means-test is often specified in terms of a score based on 
responses to a questionnaire and/or a home visit by a social worker. In some countries, the score is 
‘calibrated’ to be approximately equivalent to a pre-determined level of household income per capita. See 
Camargo and Ferreira (2001) for a discussion of the Brazilian case. 
4 This literature relies heavily on matching techniques, and draws extensively on the early work by Rubin 
(1977) and Rubin and Rosenbaum (1985). For a survey of  recent applications, see Heckman and Vytlacil 
(2002).  For a study of the effects of the Food for Education program in Bangladesh, see Ravallion and  
Ex-ante methods consist of simulating the effect of the program on the basis of 
some model of the household. These models can vary widely in complexity and coverage. 
Arithmetic simulation models simply apply official rules to determine whether or not a 
household qualifies for the program, and the amount of the transfer to be made, on the 
basis of data commonly available in typical household surveys. More sophisticated 
models include some behavioral response by households.  
Ex-ante and ex-post evaluation methods are complements, rather than substitutes. 
To begin with, they have different objectives. Ex-post methods are meant to identify the 
actual effects of a program on various dimensions of household welfare, by relying on 
the direct observation of people engaged in the program, and comparing them with those 
same dimensions in a carefully constructed comparison group, selected so as to provide a 
suitable proxy for the desired true counterfactual: “how would participants have fared, 
had they not participated?”. In some sense, these are the only “true” evaluations of a 
program.  
Even when comparison groups are perfectly believable proxies for the 
counterfactual, however, ex-post evaluations leave some policy-relevant questions 
unanswered. These questions typically refer to how impact might change if some aspect 
of the program design – such as the level of the means-test; the nature of the behavioral 
conditions imposed; or the level of the transfer benefits - changes. It is difficult enough to 
obtain an actual control group to compare with a single program design in reality. It is 
likely to be impossible to “test” many different designs in experimental conditions. Ex-
ante methods are valuable tools exactly because it is easier to experiment on computers 
than on people. These methods are essentially prospective since they rely on a set of 
assumptions about what households are likely to do when faced with the program. They 
also permit direct counterfactual analysis of alternative programs for which no ex-post 
data can be available. Thus, they are indispensable when designing a program or 
reforming existing ones.  
                                                                                                                                                   
Wodon (2000). A number of important studies of Progresa were undertaken under the auspices of the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). See, in particular, Parker and Skoufias (2000) and 
Schultz (2000).  
Simulation models of redistribution schemes based on micro data sets are widely 
used in developed countries, especially to analyze the effect of the numerous and often 
complex cash transfer instruments found in those countries. Given the progress of direct 
cash transfers in developing countries, building the same type of models in developing 
countries may become necessary.
5 However, the specific behavioral conditionality that 
characterizes these programs requires modifications, and a focus on different aspects of 
household behavior. The present paper takes a step in that direction by proposing a 
simple ex-ante evaluation methodology for conditional means-tested transfer programs. 
We apply the method to the new federal design of Bolsa Escola, in Brazil, and we are 
concerned with both dimensions cited by the program administrators as their objectives:  
(i) the reduction of current levels of poverty and inequality; and (ii) the provision of 
incentives for the reduction of future poverty, through increased school enrollment 
among poor children today. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Bolsa Escola program, 
as it was launched at the federal level in Brazil in 2001. Section 3 presents the simple 
econometric model used for simulating the effects of the program. Given the 
conditionality of Bolsa Escola, this model essentially deals with the demand for 
schooling and therefore draws on the recent literature on child labor.  The estimation of 
the model is dealt with in Section 4, whereas the simulation of program effects and a 
comparison with alternative program designs are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2.  Main features of the Bolsa Escola program 
  
The Brazilian national Bolsa Escola program, created by a law of April 2001 
within the broader context of the social development initiative known as Projeto 
Alvorada, is the generalization at the federal level of earlier programs, which were 
pioneered in the Federal District and in the city of Campinas (SP) in 1995, and later 
                                                 
5 See, for instance, Harding (1996).  On the need for and difficulties with building the same type of models 
in developing countries, see Atkinson and Bourguignon (1991).   
extended to several other localities.
6 The law of April 2001 made these various programs 
uniform in terms of coverage, transfer amounts and the associated conditionality. It also 
provided federal funding. Yet, the monitoring of the program itself is left under the 
responsibility of municipal governments.  
The rules of the program are rather simple. Households with monetary income per 
capita below 90 Reais (R$)
7 per month – which was equivalent to half a minimum wage 
when the law was introduced - and with children aged 6 to 15 qualify for the Bolsa 
Escola  program, provided that children attend school regularly. The minimum rate of 
school attendance is set at 85 per cent and schools are supposed to report this rate to 
municipal governments for program beneficiaries. The monthly benefit is R$15 per child 
attending school, up to a maximum of R$45 per household.  Transfers are generally paid 
to the mother, upon presentation of a magnetic card that greatly facilitates the monitoring 
of the whole program.   
The management of the program is essentially local. Yet, control will be operated 
at two levels. At the federal level, the number of beneficiaries claimed by municipal 
governments will be checked for consistency against local aggregate indicators of 
affluence. In case of discrepancy, local governments will have to adjust the number of 
beneficiaries on the basis of income per capita rankings. At the local level, the 
responsibility for checking the veracity of self-reported incomes is left to municipalities. 
It is estimated that some ten million children (in six million households) will 
benefit from this program. This represents approximately 17 percent of the whole 
population, reached at a cost slightly below 0.2 percent of GDP. The latter proportion is 
higher in terms of household disposable income: 0.45 percent when using household 
income reported in the PNAD survey and 0.3 per cent when using National Accounts. Of 
course, this figure is considerably higher when expressed in terms of targeted households. 
Even so, it amounts to no more than 5 percent of the income of the bottom two deciles.  
 
                                                 
6 Early studies of these original programs include Abramovay et. al. (1998); Rocha and Sabóia (1998) and 
Sant’Ana and Moraes (1997). A comprehensive assessment of different experiences with Bolsa Escola 
across Brazil can be found in World Bank (2001). There is much less written on the federal program, for 
the good reason that its implementation in practice is only just beginning. The description given in this 
section draws on the official Ministério da Educação website, at http://www.mec.gov.brhome/bolsaesc. 
7 Approximately US$ 30, at August 2002 exchange rates.   
 3.   A simple framework for modeling and simulating Bolsa Escola  
 
The effects of such a transfer scheme on the Brazilian distribution of income could be 
simulated by simply applying the aforementioned rules to a representative sample of 
households, as given for instance by the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios 
(PNAD), fielded annually by the Brazilian Central Statistical Office (IBGE). This would 
have been an example of what was referred to above as 'arithmetic' simulation. Yet, for a 
program which has a change in household behavior as one of its explicit objectives, this 
would clearly be inappropriate. After all, Bolsa Escola aims not only to reduce current 
poverty by targeting transfers to today’s poor, but also to encourage school attendance by 
poor children who are not currently enrolled, and to discourage evasion by those who are. 
Any ex-ante evaluation of such a policy must therefore go beyond simply counting the 
additional income accruing to households under the assumption of no change in 
schooling behavior. Simulating Bolsa Escola thus requires some structural modeling of 
the demand for schooling. This section presents and discusses the model being used in 
this paper. 
There is a rather large literature on the demand for schooling in developing 
countries and the related issue of child labor. The main purpose of that literature is to 
understand the reasons why parents would prefer to have their kids working within or 
outside the household rather than going to school. Various motives have been identified 
and analyzed from a theoretical point of view,
8 whereas numerous empirical attempts 
have been made at testing the relevance of these motives, measuring their relative 
strength and evaluating the likely effects of policies.
9 The empirical analysis is difficult 
for various inter-related reasons. First, the rationale behind the decision on child labor or 
school enrollment is by itself intricate. In particular, it is an inherently intertemporal 
decision, and it will differ depending on whether households behave as a unitary model, 
or whether internal bargaining takes place. Second, it is difficult to claim exogeneity for 
most plausible explanatory variables, and yet no obvious instrument is available for 
                                                 
8 See the well-known survey by Basu (1999) as well as the recent contribution by Baland and Robinson 
(2001). 
9  Early contributions to that literature include Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977), as well as Gertler and 
Glewwe (1990). For more recent contributions and short surveys of the recent literature see Freije and 
Lopez-Calva (2000), Bhalotra (2000). On policy see Grootaert and Patrinos (1999).   
correcting the resulting biases. Third, fully structural models that would permit a rigorous 
analysis of policies are complex and therefore hard to estimate while maintaining a 
reasonable degree of robustness.  
In light of these difficulties, our aims are modest and our approach is operational: 
rather than proposing a new, more complete structural model of the demand for schooling 
and intra-household labor allocation, we aim simply to obtain reasonable orders of 
magnitude for the likely effects of  transfer programs of this kind. We thus make the 
choice to limit the structural aspects of the modeling exercise to the minimum necessary 
to capture the main effects of the program.  
In particular, we make four crucial simplifying assumptions. First, we entirely 
ignore the issue of how the decision about a child’s time allocation is made within the 
household. We thus bypass the discussion of unitary versus collective decision-making 
models of household. Instead, we treat our model of occupational choice as a reduced-
form reflection of the outcome of whichever decision-making process took place within 
the household.
10  Second, we consider that the decision to send a child to school is made 
after all occupational decisions by adults within the household have been made, and does 
not affect those decisions. Third, we do not discuss here the issue of various siblings in 
the same household and the simultaneity of the corresponding decision. The model that is 
discussed thus is supposed to apply to all children at schooling age within a household. 
Fourth, we take the composition of the household as exogenous.  
Under these assumptions, let Si be a qualitative variable representing the 
occupational choice made for a child in household i. This variable will take the value 0 if 
the child does not attend school, the value 1 if she goes to school and works outside the 
household and the value 2 if she goes to school and does not work outside the household. 
When Si=0, it will be assumed that the child works full time either at home or on the 
market, earnings being observed only in the latter case. Similarly, Si=2 allows for the 
possibility that the child may be employed in domestic activities at the same time he/she 
goes to school. The occupational choice variable Si will be modeled using the standard 
utility-maximizing interpretation of the multinomial Logit framework, so that: 
                                                 
10 For a discussion of how intra-household bargaining affects the occupational choice of members, see 
Chiappori (1992). See also Bourguignon and Chiappori (1994) and Browning et. al. (1994).  
Si =  k  iff  Sk(Ai,  Xi, Hi; Y-i + yik) + vik > Sj(Ai, Xi, Hi; Y-i + yij) + vij  for j ≠ k       (1) 
 
where Sk( ) is a latent function reflecting the net utility of choosing alternative k (=0, 1 or 
2) for deciders in the household. Ai is the age of the child I; Xi is a vector of her 
characteristics; Hi, is a vector of the characteristics of the household she belongs to - size, 
age of parents, education of parents, presence of other children at school age, distance 
from school, etc.; Y-i is the total income of household members other than the child and 
yij is the total contribution of the child towards the income of the household, depending 
on her occupational choice j.  Finally, vij is a random normal variable that stands for the 
unobserved heterogeneity of observed schooling/participation behavior. If we collapse all 
non-income explanatory variables into a single vector Zi and linearize, (1) can be written 
as:  
Ui(j) = Sj(Ai, Xi, Hi; Y-i + yij) + vji  =  Zi.γj + (Y-i + yij)αj + vij         (2) 
This representation of the occupational choice of children is very parsimonious. In 
particular, by allowing the coefficients γj and αj to differ without any constraints across 
the various alternatives, we are allowing all possible tradeoffs between the schooling of 
the child and his/her future income, and the current income of the household. Note also 
that the preceding model implicitly treats the child's number of hours of work as a 
discrete choice. Presumably that number is larger in alternative 0 than in alternative 1 
because schooling is taking some time away. This may be reflected in the definition of 
the child income variable yij as follows. Denote the observed market earnings of the child 
as wi. Assuming that these are determined in accordance with the standard Becker-
Mincer human capital model, write:  
Log wi = Xi .δ +  m*Ind(Sj=1) + ui        (3) 
where Xi is a set of individual characteristics – including age and schooling 
achieved - and where ui is a random term that stands for unobserved earnings 
determinants. Assumptions on that term will be discussed below. The second term on the 
right hand side takes into account the preceding remark on the number of hours of work. 
Children who attend school and are also reported to work on the market presumably have  
less time available and may thus earn less. Based on (3), the child's contribution to the 
household income, yij, in the various alternative j is defined as follows: 
yi0 = Kwi ;    yi1 = M yi0 = MKwi ; yi2 = D yi0 = D Kwi     with M = Exp(m)       (4) 
where it is assumed that  yij  covers both market and domestic child labor. Thus domestic 
income is proportional to actual or potential market earnings, wi, in a proportion K for 
people who do not go to school. Going to school while keeping working outside the 
household means a reduction in the proportion 1-M of domestic and market income. 
Finally, going to school without working on the market means a reduction in the 
proportion 1-D of total child income, which in that case is purely domestic. The 
proportions K and D are not observed. However, the proportion M is taken to be the same 
for domestic and market work and may be estimated on the basis of observed earnings.  
Replacing (4) in (2) leads to :  
Ui(j) = Sj(Ai, Xi, Hi; Y-i + yij) + vji  =  Zi.γj + Y-i αj + βj.wi + vij  
with : β0 = α0 K ;    β1 = α1MK;  β2 = α2  D K       ( 5 )  
We now have a complete simulation model. If all coefficients α, β, γ are known, 
as well as the actual or potential market earnings, wi and the residual terms vij , then the 
child’s occupational type selected by household i is: 
k* = Arg max[Ui(j)]         (6) 
Equation (5) represents the utility of household i under occupational choice j 
[Ui(j)] in the benchmark case. If the Bolsa Escola program entitled all children
11 going to 
school to a transfer T, (5) would be replaced by:  
Ui(j) =   Zi.γj + (Y-I +BEij).αj + βj.wi + vij    with BEi0=0 and BEi1 = BEi2 = T  (7) 
Under the assumptions we have made, equation (7) is our full reduced-form 
model of the occupational choice of children, and would allow for simulations of the 
impact of Bolsa Escola transfers on those choices. All that remains is to obtain estimates 
of β, γ, α, wi and the vij's. 
 
                                                 
11 It will prove simpler to discuss the estimation problem under this simplifying assumption. We 
reintroduce the means test, without any loss of generality, at the simulation stage.  
Estimation of the discrete choice model 
Assuming that the vij are iid across sample observations with a double exponential 
distribution leads to the well-known multi-logit model. However, some precautions must 
be taken in this case. It is well known that the probability that household i will select 
occupational choice k is given by:  
∑ + +
+ +
=
−
−
j
j i j i j i
k i k i k i
ik w Y Z Exp
w Y Z Exp
p
) . . (
. . (
β α γ
β α γ
       ( 8 )  
Taking regime j = 0 as a reference, the preceding probability may be written as:  
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  for j = 1, 2  (9) 
and pi0 = 1 – pi1 – pi2 . 
The difficulty is that the Multinomial logit estimation permits identifying only the 
differences (αj-α0), (βj-β0), and (γj-γ0) for j = 1, 2. Yet, inspection of (6) and (7) indicates 
that – since the Bolsa Escola transfer is state-contingent, meaning that the income 
variable is asymmetric across alternatives - it is necessary to know all three coefficients 
α0 , α1  and α2  in order to find the utility maximizing alternative, k*.   
This is where the only structural assumption made so far becomes useful. Call  j a ˆ  
and  j b ˆ  the estimated coefficients of the multilogit model corresponding to the income 
and the child earning variables for alternatives j = 1, 2, the alternative 0 being taken as the 
default. Then (5) implies the following system of equations:  
2 0 2
1 0 1
2 0 2
1 0 1
ˆ ) (
ˆ ). (
ˆ
ˆ
b K D
b K M
a
a
= −
= −
= −
= −
α α
α α
α α
α α
         ( 1 0 )  
M is known from equation (3). It follows that arbitrarily setting a value for K or for D 
allows us to identify α0 , α1  and α2  and the remaining parameter in the pair (K,D). The 
identifying assumption made in what follows is that kids working on the market and not  
going to school have zero domestic production, i.e. K = 1. In other words, it is assumed 
that the observed labor allocations between market and domestic activities are corner 
solutions in all alternatives.
12 It then follows that :  
1 2 1 2
1 1
1 ˆ ˆ and
1
ˆ ˆ
a a
M
b a
− + =
−
−
= α α α        ( 1 1 )  
Of course, a test of the relevance of the identifying assumption is that both α1 and 
α2 must be positive. One could also require that the value of D obtained from system (9) 
with K=1 be in the interval (0,1).  
For completeness, it remains to indicate how estimates of the residual terms vij-vi0 
may be obtained. In a discrete choice model these values cannot be observed. It is only 
known that they belong to some interval. The idea is then to draw them for each 
observation in the relevant interval, that is: in a way consistent with the observed choice. 
For instance if observation i has made choice 1, it must be the case that :  
Zi.γ1 + Y-i.  1 ˆ a  + 1 ˆ b .wi + (vi1-vi0) > Sup[0, Zi.γ2 + Y-i.  2 ˆ a  + 2 ˆ b .wi + (vi2-vi0)] 
The terms vij-vi0 must be drawn so as to satisfy that inequality. All that is missing now is 
a complete vector of child earnings values, wi. 
 
Estimation of potential earnings 
The discrete choice model requires a potential earning for each child, including 
those who do not work outside the household.  To be fully rigorous, one could estimate 
both the discrete choice model and the earning equation simultaneously by maximum 
likelihood techniques. This is a rather cumbersome procedure. Practically, a multinomial 
probit would then be preferable to a multinomial logit in order to handle simultaneously 
the random terms of the discrete choice model and that of the earning equation.   
Integrating tri-variate normal distributions would then be required. Also, other issues 
which are already apparent with a simpler technique would not necessarily be solved.  
                                                 
12 In effect, this assumption may be weakened using some limited information on hours of work available 
in the survey.  
We adopt a simpler approach, which has the advantages of transparency and 
robustness. It consists of estimating (3) by OLS, and then to generate random terms ui for 
non-working kids, by drawing in the distribution generated by the residuals of the OLS 
estimation.  
There are several reasons why correcting the estimation of the earning function 
for a selection bias was problematic. First, instrumenting earnings with a selection bias 
correction procedure requires finding instruments that would affect earnings but not the 
schooling/labor choice.  No such instrument was readily available. Second, the correction 
of selection bias with the standard two-stage procedure is awkward in the case of more 
than two choices. Lee (1983) proposed a generalization of the Heckman procedure, but it 
has been shown that Lee's procedure was justified only in a rather unlikely particular 
case.
13 For both of these reasons, failing to correct for possible selection bias in (3) did 
not seem too serious a problem. On the other hand, trying to correct using standard 
techniques and no convincing instrument led to rather implausible results.  
 
Simulating programs of the Bolsa Escola type 
As mentioned in footnote 11, the model (6)-(7) does not provide a complete 
representation of the choice faced by households in the presence of a program such as 
Bolsa Escola. This is because it takes into account the conditionality on the schooling of 
the children, but not the means-test. Taking into account both the means-test and the 
conditionality leads to choosing the alternative with maximum utility among the three 
following conditional cases:  
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    (12) 
where Y° stands for the means test. Of course, as mentioned above, only the differences 
between the utility corresponding to the three cases matter, so that one only need to know 
                                                 
13 See Bourguignon et al. (2001).   
the differences (βj-β0), (γj-γ0) and (vij- vi0)– but the three coefficients αj. In this system, 
one can see how the introduction of Bolsa Escola might lead households from choice (0) 
– no schooling – to choices (1) or (2), but also from choice (1) to choice (2). In the latter 
case, a household might not qualify for the transfer T when the child both works and 
attends school, but qualifies if she stops working.  
A wide variety of programs may be easily simulated using this framework. Both 
the means-test and the transfer T could be made dependent on characteristics of either the 
household or the child (X and H). In particular, T could depend on age or gender. Some 
examples of such alternative designs are simulated and discussed in Section 5.  
 
Before presenting the model estimations results, we should draw attention to two 
important limitations of the framework just described. Both arise from the set of 
assumptions discussed in the beginning of this section. The first limitation is that we can 
not take into account the household transfer ceiling of R$45 per household. The reason is 
that by ignoring multi-children interactions in the model, it is as though we had 
effectively assumed that all households were single-child, from a behavioral point of 
view. In the non-behavioral part of the welfare simulations which are reported in Section 
5 below, however, each child was treated separately, and the R$45 limit was applied.  
The second limitation has to do with the exogeneity of non-child income Y-I. This 
exogeneity would clearly be a problem when there are more than one child at schooling 
age. But it is also unrealistic even when only adult income is taken into account. It is 
clearly possible that the presence of the means-test might affect the labor supply behavior 
of adults, since there are circumstances in which it might be in the interest of the family 
to work slightly less in order to qualify for Bolsa Escola. Note, however, that this might 
not be so sharply the case if the means-test is based, not on current income, but on some 
score-based proxy for permanent income, as appears to be the case in practice.  
 
 
 
  
4.   Descriptive statistics and estimation results 
 
The model consisting of equations (3) and (12) was estimated on data from the 
1999 PNAD household survey.  This survey is based on a sample of approximately 
60,000 households, which is representative of the national population
14. Although all 
children aged 6-15 qualify for participation in the program, the model was only estimated 
for 10-15 year-olds, since school enrollment below age 10 is nearly universal.
15 At the 
simulation stage, however, transfers are of course simulated for the whole universe of 
qualifying 6-15 year-olds.  
Table 1 contains the basic description of the occupational structure of children 
aged 10-15 in Brazil, in 1999. In this age range, 77% of children report that they dedicate 
themselves exclusively to studying. Some 17% both work and study, and 6% do not 
attend school at all. This average pattern hides considerable variation across ages: school 
attendance declines – and work increases – monotonically with age. Whereas only 2.5% 
of ten year-olds are out of school, the figure for fifteen year-olds is 13%. Whereas 90% of 
ten year-olds dedicate themselves exclusively to studying, fewer than 60% of fifteen 
year-olds do so. From a behavioral point of view, it is thus clear that most of the action is 
to be found among the eldest children.  
Table 2 presents the mean individual and household characteristics of those 
children, by occupational category. Children not going to school are both older and less 
educated than those still enrolled. As expected, households with school drop-outs are on 
average poorer, less educated and larger than households where kids are still going to 
school. Dropping out of school and engaging in child labor are relatively more frequent 
among non-whites and in the North-East. Both forms of behavior are least common in 
metropolitan areas, but proportionately more common in non-metropolitan urban areas 
than in rural areas. Interestingly, households where children both work and go to school 
                                                 
14 Except for the rural areas of the states of Acre, Amazonas, Pará, Rondônia and Roraima. 
15 We know that school enrolment is  nearly universal from answers to schooling questions in the PNAD. 
An additional reason to limit the estimation of the behavioral model to children aged ten or older is that the 
incidence of child labor at lower ages is probably measured with much greater error, since PNAD 
interviewers are instructed to pose labor and income questions only to individuals aged ten or older.  
are in an intermediate position, along all dimensions, between those whose children 
specialize, but are generally closer to the group of drop-outs.  
A remarkable feature of Table 2 is the observed amount of children’s earnings, 
when they work and do not study. Ranging from around R$80 to R$120 per month, 
children's earnings represent approximately half the minimum wage, an order of 
magnitude that seems rather reasonable. These amounts compares with the R$15 transfer 
that is granted by the Bolsa Escola program for children enrolled in school. Note, 
however, that the R$90 figure is not a good measure for the opportunity cost of 
schooling, since school attendance is evidently consistent with some amount of market 
work.   
Tables 3 and 4 contain the estimation results. Because of the great behavioral 
variation across ages even within the 10-15 range - as revealed, for instance, in Table 1 -
we estimated the (identically specified) model separately for each age, as well as for the 
pooled sample of all 10-15 year-olds. The simulations reported in the next section rely on 
the age-specific models, but in this section we focus on the joint estimation, both for ease 
of discussion and because the larger sample size allowed for more precise estimation in 
this case. 
 Table 3 shows the results of the OLS estimation of the earnings function (3), both 
for the pooled sample and for the 15 year-old group.
16 Geographical variables
17, race and 
gender have the expected sign, and the same qualitative effect as for adults. So does (the 
logarithm of) the average earnings of children in the census cluster, which is included as 
a proxy for the spatial variation in the demand for child labor. The effect of previous 
schooling is best described as insignificant. Even though the coefficient of the squared 
term is positive and significant, the influence of the (negative and insignificant) linear 
term implies that earnings decline with schooling in the range relevant for 10-15 year-
olds. It should be noted that our separate specifications mask the main determinant of 
earnings for children, namely age. In an alternative (unreported) specification for the 
pooled sample, when age was included as an explanatory variable, an additional year of 
                                                 
16 Analogous results for the 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 year-old samples are available from the authors on 
request. 
17 With the South being insignificantly different from the reference Southeast region, as expected.  
age increased earnings by approximately 40 per cent. But there was a clear non-linearity 
in the way age affected earnings, which is reflected in changes in the coefficient estimates 
when the model is separately estimated. These non-linearities and interactions between 
age and other determinants are the reason why the separate specification was preferred.  
The estimate for m – the coefficient for “dummy WS” in Table 3 – reveals that, as 
expected, the fact that a child goes to school at the same time as she works outside the 
household reduces total earnings in comparison with a comparable child who dedicates 
herself exclusively to market work. If one interprets this coefficient as reflecting fewer 
hours of work, then a child going to school works on average 40 per cent less than a 
dropout (for the pooled sample), or just under a quarter less for fifteen year-olds. These 
seem like reasonable orders of magnitude.  
The results from the estimation of the multinomial logit for occupational choice 
also appear eminently plausible. They are reported in Table 4 (for the pooled sample) and 
Tables 4a and 4b for 10-12 and 13-15 year-olds, respectively. The reference category was 
“not studying” (j = 0), throughout. As expected, household income (net of the child’s) has 
a positive effect on schooling, whereas the child’s own (predicted) earnings have a 
negative effect. Household size reduces the probability of studying, compared to the 
alternatives.
18 Previous schooling at a given age has a positive (but concave) effect. Race 
has an insignificant effect on occupational choice, unlike gender which reflects the usual 
asymmetry between market work for males and domestic work for females. Parents' 
education has the expected positive effect – on top of the income effect - on children's 
schooling.  
In view of this general consistency of both the earnings and the discrete 
occupational choice models, the question now arises of  whether the structural restrictions 
necessary for the consistency of the proposed simulation work – positive α1 and α2, and 0 
< D < 1 - hold or not.  For the pooled sample and using (11), we find that:  
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18 To the extent that household size reflects a larger number of children, this is consistent with Becker’s 
quantity-quality trade-off.  
The coefficients of income in the utility of alternatives j = 1 and 2 is thus positive, 
which is in agreement with the original model. This is also true of the utility of alternative 
j =0 since it may be computed that α0 = 0.023. The value of the parameter D may also be 
derived. Under the identifying assumption that K =1, it is given by :  
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This figure means that children who are going to school but do not work on the 
market are estimated to provide domestic production for approximately two-thirds of 
their potential market earnings. Note that this is almost identical to the estimated value 
for M [= Exp (-0.4118) = 0.6625]. Since M denotes the average contribution to household 
income from children both studying and working, as a share of their potential 
contribution if not studying, this implies that the estimated value of non-market work by 
children studying (and not working in the market) is approximately equal to the market 
value of work by those studying (and working in the market). If there was little selection 
on unobservables into market work, this is exactly what one would expect. 
Overall, the estimates obtained from the multinomial discrete occupational choice 
model and the earning equation seem therefore remarkably consistent with rational, 
utility-maximizing behavior. We may thus expect simulations run on the basis of these 
models and the identifying structural assumptions about the parameter K to yield sensible 
results. We can now turn to our main objective: gauging the order of magnitude of the 
effects of programs such as Bolsa Escola.  
 
5.   An ex-ante evaluation of Bolsa Escola and alternative program designs 
 
Bolsa Escola – and many conditional cash transfer schemes like it – are said to 
have two distinct objectives: (i) to reduce current poverty (and sometimes inequality) 
through the targeted transfers, and (ii) to reduce future poverty, by increasing the 
incentives for today’s poor to invest in their human capital. Later on in this section, we 
will turn to the first objective. We begin by noting, however, that, as stated, the second 
objective is impossible to evaluate, even in an ex-ante manner. Whether increased school  
enrollment translates into greater human capital depends on the trends in the quality of 
the educational services provided, and there is no information on that in this data set.
19 
Finally, whether more “human capital”, however measured., will help reduce poverty in 
the future or not, depends on what happens to the rates of return to it between now and 
then. This is a complex, general equilibrium question, which goes well beyond the scope 
of this exercise.  
What we might be able to say something about is the intermediate target of 
increasing school enrollment. While the preceding remarks suggest that this is not 
sufficient to establish whether the program will have an impact on future poverty, it is at 
least necessary.
20 An ex-ante evaluation of impact on this dimension of the program thus 
requires simulating the number of children that may change schooling and working status 
because of it.  
This is done by applying the decision system (12) - with behavioral parameter 
values (α, β, γ, M and D) estimated from (9) - (11), and policy parameter values (T and 
Y
0) taken from the actual specification of Bolsa Escola - to the original data. Equation 
(12) is then used to simulate a counterfactual distribution of occupations, on the basis of 
the observed characteristics and the restrictions on residual terms for each individual 
child. Comparing the vector of occupational choices thus generated with the original, 
observed vector, we see that the program leads to some children moving from choice Si= 
0 to choices Si=1 or 2, and from Si= 1 to choices Si= 2.  The corresponding transition 
matrix is shown in table 5 for all children between 10 and 15, as well as for all children in 
the same age group living in poor households. 
21 
Despite the small value of the proposed transfer, Table 5 suggests that one in 
every three children (aged 10-15) who are presently not enrolled in school would get 
                                                 
19 There is limited information in other data sets, such as the Education Ministry’s Sistema de 
Acompanhamento do Ensino Básico (SAEB), but not for sufficiently long periods of time. See Albernaz et. 
al. (2002). 
20 One could argue that it is not even necessary, since the transfers might, by themselves, alleviate credit 
constraints and have long-term positive impacts, e.g. through improved nutrition. We focus on whether the 
conditional nature of these transfers actually have any impact of the children’s occupational choices (or 
time allocation decisions). 
21 A household was considered poor if its (regionally price-deflated and imputed rent-adjusted) per capita 
income was less than R$74.48 in the reference month of the 1999 PNAD survey. For the derivation of the 
poverty line, see Ferreira et al. (forthcoming).  
enough incentive from Bolsa Escola to change occupational status and go to school.   
Among them, just over a quarter would enroll, but remain employed on the labor market . 
The other three quarters would actually cease work outside their household.  This would 
reduce the proportion of children outside school from 5.8% to 3.9%.  
The impact on those currently both studying and working would be much smaller. 
Barely 2% of them would abandon work to dedicate themselves exclusively to their 
studies. As a result of this small outflow, combined with an inflow from occupational 
category 1, the group of children both studying and working would actually grow in the 
simulated scenario, albeit marginally. 
The impacts are even more pronounced, as one would expect, among the poor – 
who are the target population for the program. According to the poverty line being used, 
the incidence of poverty in Brazil is 30.5%. However, because there are more children in 
poor households – this being one of the reasons why they are poor – the proportion of 10-
15 children in poor households is much higher: 42%. The second panel in Table 5 shows 
that dropouts are much more frequent among them – 9.1 instead of 5.8 per cent for the 
whole population. It also shows that Bolsa Escola is more effective in increasing school 
enrollment. The fall in the proportion of dropouts is one-half, rather than one-third.  As a 
result, the simulation suggests that Bolsa Escola could increase the school enrollment rate 
among the poor by approximately 4.4 percentage points. Once again, this increase comes 
at the expense of the “not studying category”, whose numbers are halved, rather than of 
the “working and studying” category, which actually becomes marginally more 
numerous. 
A 50% reduction in the proportion of poor children outside school is by no means 
an insubstantial achievement, particularly in light of the fact that it seems to be 
manageable with fairly small transfers (R$15 per child per month). This is partly due to 
the fact that the value of the current contributions of children who are enrolled in school 
is a sizable proportion of their potential earnings when completely outside school. Those 
proportions are exactly the interpretation of the parameters M (for those who work on the 
market as well as study) and D (for those who work at home as well as study), which we 
estimated to be of the order of 0.66. Applying that factor to R$100, as a rough average of 
the earnings of children in category j = 0 (see Table 2), we are left with some R$33 as the  
true opportunity cost of enrolling in school. Consequently, those children who change 
occupation from that category in response to the R$15 transfer must have average 
personal present valuations of the expected stream of benefits from enrolling greater than 
R$18. Those who don’t, must on average value education at less than that. 
  Because our simulations suggest that Bolsa Escola, as currently formulated, 
would still leave some 4% of all 10-15 year-olds (4.7% among the poor ones) outside 
school, it is interesting to investigate the potential effects of changing some of the 
program parameters. This was, after all, one of the initial motivations for undertaking this 
kind of ex-ante counterfactual analysis. Table 6 shows the results of such a comparative 
exercise in terms of occupational choice, using transition matrices analogous to those in 
Table 5, once again both for all children and then separately for poor households only. 
Table 7 compares the impact of each scenario with that of the benchmark program 
specification, in terms of poverty and inequality measures. Four standard inequality 
measures were selected, namely the Gini coefficient and three members of the 
Generalized Entropy Class: the mean log deviation, the Theil-T index and (one half of) 
the square of the coefficient of variation. For poverty, we present the three standard FGT 
(0, 1, 2) measures, with respect to the aforementioned Ferreira et. al. (forthcoming) 
poverty line. This later table allows us to gauge impact in terms of the first objective of 
the program, namely the reduction of current poverty (and possibly inequality). 
In both tables, the simulation results for six alternative scenarios are presented. In 
scenario 1, the eligibility criteria (including the means test) are unchanged, but transfer 
amounts (and the total household ceiling) are both doubled. In scenario 2, the uniform 
R$15 per child transfer is replaced by an age-contingent transfer, whereby 10 year-olds 
would receive R$15, 11 year-olds would receive R$20, 12 year-olds would receive R$25, 
13 year-olds would receive R$35, 14 year-olds would receive R$40, and 15 year-olds 
received R$45.
22 In scenario 3, transfer amounts were unchanged, but the means-test was 
raised from R$90 to R$120. Scenario 4 combines scenarios 1 and 3: the transfer was 
doubled, and the means-test raised to R$120. Scenario 5 combines scenarios 2 and 3 in 
the same way: an age-progressive transfer with a R$120 means-test. Scenario 6 simulated 
a targeted transfer exactly as in Bolsa Escola, but with no conditionality: every child in 
                                                 
22 The household ceiling was also doubled to R$90 in this case.  
households below the means-test received the benefit, with no requirement relating to 
school attendance.  
Table 6 gives rise to three main results. First of all, a comparison of Scenario 6 
and the actual Bolsa Escola program suggests that conditionality plays a crucial role in 
inducing the change in children’s time-allocation decisions. The proportions of children 
in each occupational category under Scenario 6 are almost identical to the original data 
(i.e. no program). This suggests that it is the conditional requirement to enroll in order to 
receive the benefit – rather than the pure income effect from the transfer - which is the 
primary cause of the extra demand for schooling evident in the Bolsa Escola column. 
Second, scenario 1 reveals that the occupational impact of the program is 
reasonably elastic with respect to the transfer amount. The proportion of un-enrolled 
children drops another percentage point (i.e. some 25%) in response to a doubling of the 
transfers. The proportion of children in the “studying only” category rises by the same 
percentage point. Scenario 2 suggests that it doesn’t matter much, in aggregate terms, 
whether this increase in transfers is uniform across ages, or made to become increasing in 
the age of the child. Finally, scenario 3 (and the combinations in scenarios 4 and 5) 
suggest that occupational effects are less sensitive to the means-test than to the transfer 
amount. 
  Results are considerably less impressive in terms of the program’s first stated 
objective, namely the reduction in current poverty (and inequality) levels. Table 7 
suggests that the program, as currently envisaged, would only imply a one percentage 
point decline in the short-run incidence of poverty in Brazil, as measured by P(0). 
However, there is some evidence that the transfers would be rather well targeted, since 
the inequality-averse poverty indicator P(2) would fall by proportionately more than P(0), 
from 8% to 7%. This is consistent with the inequality results: whereas the Gini would fall 
by only half a point as a result of the scheme, measures which are more sensitive to the 
bottom, such as the mean log deviation, fall by a little more. Overall, however, the 
evidence in column 2 of Table 7 falls considerably short of a ringing endorsement of 
Bolsa Escola as a program for the alleviation of current poverty or inequality. 
  The situation could be somewhat improved by increases in the transfer amounts 
(scenarios 1 and 2). Nevertheless, even a doubling of the transfer amount to R$30 per  
month would only shave another 1.3 percentage points off the headcount.
23 An increase 
in the means-test would not help much, as indicated by Scenario 3. This is consistent with 
our earlier suggestion that the program already appears to be well-targeted to the poor. If 
it fails to lift many of them above the poverty line, this is a consequence of the small size 
of the transfers, rather than of the targeting.  
These results contrast with the arithmetic simulations reported by Camargo and 
Ferreira (2001), in which a somewhat broader, but essentially similar program would 
reduce the incidence of poverty (with respect to the same poverty line and in the same 
sample) by two-thirds, from 30.5% to 9.9%. This was despite the fact that the absence of 
a behavioral component to the simulation weakened its power, by excluding from the set 
of recipients those households whose children might have enrolled in response to the 
program. The reason is simple: Camargo and Ferreira simulate much higher transfer 
levels, ranging from R$150 to R$220 per household (rather than child). 
 
6.   Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we proposed a micro-simulation method for evaluating and experimenting 
with conditional cash-transfer program designs, ex-ante. We were concerned with the 
impacts of the Brazilian Bolsa Escola program, which aims to reduce both current and 
future poverty by providing small targeted cash transfers to poor households, provided 
their children are enrolled in and in actual attendance at school. We were interested in 
assessing two dimensions of the program: its impact on the occupational choice (or time-
allocation) decisions of children, and the effects on current poverty and inequality. 
  For this purpose, we estimated a discrete occupational choice model (a 
multinomial logit) on a nationally representative household-level sample, and used its 
estimated parameters to make predictions about the counterfactual occupational decisions 
of children, under different assumptions about the availability and design of cash transfer 
programs. These  assumptions were basically expressed in terms of different values for 
                                                 
23 The simulated one-percentage-point fall in P(2) is, once again, more respectable.  
two key policy parameters: the means-test level of household income; and the transfer 
amount. 
  Because predicted earnings values were needed for all children in the simulation, 
this procedure also required estimating a Mincerian earnings equation for children in the 
sample, and using it to predict earnings in some cases. Also, because the income values 
accruing to each household were not symmetric across different occupational choices, 
standard estimation procedures for the multinomial logit were not valid. An identification 
assumption was needed, and we chose it to be that children not enrolled in school work 
only in the market, and have a zero contribution to domestic work. Under this 
assumption, the estimation of the model generated remarkably consistent results: 
marginal utilities of income were always positive, and very similar across occupational 
categories. Time spent working by those enrolled in school, as a fraction of time spent 
working by those not enrolled, was always in the (0, 1) interval and was basically 
identical – and equal to two-thirds - whether work was domestic or in the market. 
  When this estimated occupational choice model was used to simulate the official 
(April 2001) design of the federal Brazilian Bolsa Escola program, we found that there 
was considerable behavioral response from children to the program. About one third of 
all 10-15 year-olds not currently enrolled in school would – according to the model – 
enrol in response to the program. Among poor households, this proportion was even 
higher: one half would enter school. The proportion of children in the middle 
occupational category (“studying and working in the market”) would not fall. In fact, it 
would rise, marginally. 
  Results in terms of the reduction of current poverty, however, were less 
heartening. As currently designed, the federal Bolsa Escola program would reduce 
poverty incidence by one percentage point only, and the Gini coefficient by half a point. 
Results were better for measures more sensitive to the bottom of the distribution, but the 
effect was never remarkable. 
  Both the proportion of children enrolling in school in response to program 
availability and the degree of reduction in current poverty turn out to be rather sensitive 
to transfer amounts, and rather insensitive to the level of the means-test. This suggests 
that the targeting of the Brazilian Bolsa Escola program is adequate, but that poverty  
reduction through this instrument, although effective, is not magical. Governments may 
be transferring cash in an intelligent and efficient way, but they still need to transfer more 
substantial amounts, if they hope to make a dent in the country’s high levels of 
deprivation.  
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10 11 12 13 14 15 Total
Not  Studying 2.5% 2.3% 3.3% 5.6% 8.0% 13.0% 5.8%
Working and Studying 8.1% 10.9% 14.0% 18.3% 22.6% 27.3% 16.9%
Studying 89.4% 86.8% 82.7% 76.1% 69.4% 59.6% 77.3%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: PNAD/IBGE 1999 and author's calculation
Table 1: School enrollment and occupation of children by age (10-15 years old)
 
 
 
 
Not studying Working and Studying Studying Total
Age 13.5 13.2 12.3 12.51
Years of schooling 2.9 3.9 4.1 3.97
Household per capita income 80.9 104.5 202.0 178.25
Earning's children (observed)
10 118.4 34.2 - 38.0
11 98.3 44.6 - 50.4
12 100.7 50.8 - 57.0
13 76.8 66.9 - 68.5
14 100.5 83.8 - 87.8
15 127.6 109.3 - 113.9
Years of schooling of the most educated parent 3.2 4.0 6.4 5.79
Age of the oldest parent 46.4 46.1 44.5 44.89
Number of household members 5.8 5.9 5.2 5.39
Race (White) 36.9% 40.9% 51.6% 48.9%
Gender (Male) 53.0% 65.2% 46.9% 50.3%
North 6.1% 5.6% 6.0% 5.9%
Northeast 40.4% 45.6% 29.9% 33.2%
Southeast 32.8% 26.1% 43.5% 39.9%
South 14.1% 15.9% 13.7% 14.1%
Center-West 6.6% 6.7% 6.9% 6.9%
Metropolitan area 18.2% 12.8% 30.9% 27.1%
Urban non metroplitan 34.0% 49.2% 16.0% 22.7%
Rural areas 47.8% 38.0% 53.0% 50.2%
Proportion of universe 6.1% 16.8% 77.1% 100.0%
Population 1,208,313 3,345,075 15,329,237 19,882,625
Source: PNAD/IBGE 1999 and author's calculation
Table 2 : Sample means. Characteristics of children and the household they belong to (10-15 years old only)
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not Studying Working and Studying Studying Total
Not Studying 66.6% 9.0% 24.4% 5.8%
Working and Studying - 98.1% 1.9% 16.9%
Studying - - 100.0% 77.3%
Total 3.9% 17.1% 79.1% 100.0%
Not Studying Working and Studying Studying Total
Not Studying 52.0% 13.4% 34.6% 9.1%
Working and Studying - 99.0% 1.0% 23.7%
Studying - - 100.0% 67.2%
Total 4.7% 24.7% 70.6% 100.0%
Source: PNAD/IBGE 1999 and author's calculation
Poor Households
Table 5: Simulated effect of Bolsa Escola on schooling and working status (all children 10-15 years old)
All Households 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Simulated distributional effects of alternative specifications of the conditional cash transfer program
Original Bolsa escola's program Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6
Mean Income per capita 253.9 255.0 256.1 255.8 255.2 256.5 256.3 255.1
Inequality measures
Gini coefficient 0.594 0.589 0.584 0.585 0.588 0.583 0.584 0.589
Mean logarithmic deviation 0.704 0.670 0.647 0.652 0.669 0.644 0.649 0.668
Theil index 0.710 0.700 0.690 0.692 0.699 0.687 0.689 0.699
Generalized Entropy (2) 1.605 1.589 1.572 1.575 1.585 1.565 1.569 1.587
Poverty measures
Poverty headcount 30.5% 29.5% 28.2% 28.5% 29.5% 28.2% 28.5% 29.4%
Poverty gap 13.5% 12.4% 11.2% 11.5% 12.4% 11.2% 11.5% 12.3%
Total square deviation from poverty line 8.1% 7.1% 6.2% 6.4% 7.1% 6.2% 6.4% 7.0%
Annual cost of the program (million Reais) 1,668 3,228 3,000 1,944 3,984 3,720 1,668
Source: PNAD/IBGE 1999 and author's calculation 
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